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Abstract: A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of
control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against
this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal
information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not
accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication
that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases.
Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward
Snowden’s revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile
phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this
paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is
based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the
control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in
threatened loss cases.
Keywords: privacy, control, Edward Snowden, state surveillance, leeway control,
source control, Frankfurt cases, threatened loss cases
1 Introduction
Many privacy scholars argue that privacy is essentially a certain kind of control.
What we worry about when we worry about privacy on the one hand and
Google, Facebook, the NSA, and so on on the other, the idea goes, is that we
may lose control over personal information, or over access to personal informa-
tion. This idea is so popular that it is often presented as the standard account of
privacy (see, e. g. Rickless 2007, p. 779; Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, p. 45;
Macnish 2018, p. 419).
However, there are debates about whether the control view really offers the
best account of the concept of privacy. In this paper, I will focus on a particular
family of cases that have been around for more than 40 years and are often
*Corresponding author: Leonhard Menges, Department of Philosophy (KGW), University of
Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria, E-mail: leonhard.menges@sbg.ac.at
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0539-0787
Moral Philosophy and Politics 2020; aop
Open Access. © 2020 Menges, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
presented as challenges for control accounts. Following Parent (1983b, p. 344), I
will call them threatened loss cases. In threatened loss cases, very roughly,
personal information about an agent is readily and easily available to another
person, but not accessed. Most authors contend that control accounts imply that
the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. And this
is typically presented as a vice of the control account of privacy. In this paper I
will challenge the first assumption. The main point I will argue for is that there
is a plausible version of the control account of privacy that implies that the
agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases.
Some may ask why this should be relevant. Discussing conceptual questions
about privacy has fallen out of fashion (see, e. g. Solove 2008, chs. 2 & 3;
Nissenbaum 2009, introduction; Allen 2013). Moreover, the way I will approach
these questions will remind some of the seemingly endless debates in analytic
philosophy about science-fiction thought experiments or farfetched situations
like Gettier, fission, or Frankfurt cases. And this will, I predict, convince some
that the project of this paper is pointless. However, Macnish (2018) has recently
effectively made a case for the claim that there still is a need for discussing the
concept or definition of privacy. And threatened loss cases play a prominent role
in his line of thinking. Let me elaborate.
Edward Snowden’s revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet
and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case.
A great deal of personal information was readily available to them, but, in most
cases, they did not access the relevant information. Macnish (2018, p. 418)
observes that there were two different public responses to Snowden’s revelation
with regard to privacy. Many contended that the practices of the secret services
invaded and diminished people’s privacy, while others, including then-NSA
director Keith Alexander, said that no privacy was diminished. Macnish suggests
that the best explanation of this disagreement is that the two parties understand
the concept of privacy in different ways. Those who say that no privacy was
diminished seem to assume that a person’s privacy is only diminished if another
person learns something about her or actually accesses information about her.
They can say that the NSA and GCHQ do not invade your privacy as long as no
one actually reads your emails, finds out with whom you communicated, where
you were, and so on. Those who disagree seem to assume that your privacy can
be diminished by another person if the latter diminishes the control you have
over your information or over access to your information. They can say that the
NSA and GCHQ diminished your privacy by making or having the relevant data
and information readily available.
It is important to distinguish between two different questions with regard to
the NSA and GCHQ cases. First, one can discuss the normative question of
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whether their activities were legitimate. What we need in order to answer this
question is an account of the values or norms disrespected or violated by the
NSA and GCHQ and what has been gained by their activities. This is the most
politically relevant project because it may help us to reform the laws that govern
the secret services.
Second, one can discuss the conceptual question of whether privacy is such
that the activities of these institutions diminished the privacy of the citizens
involved. What we need to answer this question is an account of the concept of
privacy. Such an account is only indirectly politically relevant. For example, it
does not suggest how to reform laws. However, it may help to frame the
normative and political debate in an adequate, clear, and fruitful way. When
Keith Alexander and his opponents disagree about whether or not the NSA
diminished citizens’ privacy, finding out who is right requires a good under-
standing of the concept of privacy. Moreover, even if a conceptual account fails
to frame actual political debates (which is, perhaps unfortunately, not improb-
able), a convincing account of a contested concept like privacy is itself philo-
sophically interesting.
This paper primarily contributes to answering the conceptual question. I will
discuss some normative issues in Sections 5 and 6, but the main goal is to
understand the concept of privacy by defending a prominent account against a
long-standing objection. The tradition of discussing conceptual questions by
using thought experiments and counterexamples in analytic philosophy pro-
vides us with tools that may help us to better understand threatened loss cases
and their role in exploring the concept of privacy. This is why I will look for
inspiration to one of these seemingly endless debates about certain cases.
I will begin by presenting threatened loss cases in more detail (Section 2).
Then, I will show that there are important similarities between threatened loss
and so-called Frankfurt cases in the discussion about responsibility and deter-
minism. I will argue that these similarities point to a new way to understand the
control account of privacy (Sections 3 and 4). At this point, I will have shown
that there is room for a control account which implies that people’s privacy is
not diminished in threatened loss cases. The next step is to argue that there is
good reason to accept this version of the control account. I will present some of
these reasons in Section 5. In Section 6, I will apply the resulting control account
to the NSA and GCHQ case and draw some general conclusions.
Let me make two clarifying points before I present threatened loss cases.
First, I will follow prominent opponents of the control account and primarily
talk about privacy as a state in which people can be (Parent 1983b, 1983a; Allen
1988, chap. 1, 2013; Davis 2009; Nissenbaum 2009, p. 69ff.; Macnish 2018). And I
assume that the right to privacy is, then, the right to be in the state identified by
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the best account of the concept of privacy. This should be seen as an explicit
stipulation. I am well aware that it touches on controversial issues, but this
would also be true of any other stipulation about the relation between privacy
and the right to privacy. And diving into this relation would lead us too far away
from the main points of this paper.
Second, I will only focus on informational privacy, and I will not say any-
thing about locational, bodily, decisional, or other kinds of privacy. This seems
to be acceptable because those who take threatened loss cases to pose chal-
lenges for control accounts focus on the informational context (Inness 1992,
chap. 4 takes threatened loss cases to support control accounts and she uses a
broader notion of privacy). And the proposal that I will make here should be
understood as a reply to this challenge.
2 Threatened loss cases
The first threatened loss case can be found in a footnote in Judith Jarvis
Thomson’s seminal paper on the right to privacy:
If my neighbor invents an X-ray device which enables him to look through walls, then I
should imagine I thereby lose control over who can look at me: going home and closing
the doors no longer suffices to prevent others from doing so. But my right to privacy is not
violated until my neighbor actually does train the device on the wall of my house
(Thomson 1975, n. 1).
Thomson discusses the right to privacy, not the state of having privacy, on
which I focus in this paper. William Parent also focuses on the state of privacy
and slightly modifies Thomson’s original case:
Suppose A invents a fantastic X-ray device that enables him to look right through walls. A
then focuses the device on my home but refuses to use it. Since he certainly has the power
to find out everything that I am doing in my home it cannot be said that I any longer enjoy
control over personal information about myself vis-à-vis A – at least I don’t in regard to
activities done at his home. Still A has not invaded my privacy. He doesn’t do that until he
actually looks through his device. So while the lack of control certainly threatens privacy it
does not necessarily involve its loss (Parent 1983b, p. 344; see also Rickless 2007, p. 783;
Davis 2009, p. 457; Moore 2010, p. 21 n. 35).
Parent and his followers present this case as a challenge for the control account
of privacy. The basic argument is that control accounts imply that my privacy is
diminished in this case, that this is intuitively implausible, and that, therefore,
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control accounts are intuitively implausible. Kevin Macnish argues for the same
conclusion by relying on a different threatened loss case:
[I]magine that I leave my diary on a table in a coffee shop and return to that shop 30minutes
later to retrieve it. When I enter the shop I see a stranger with my diary on her table, a
different table from the one at which I was sitting. I therefore know that she, or someone,
has moved my diary; but have they read it? I have not been in control of my diary for half an
hour, in which time anything might have happened to it (Macnish 2018, p. 420).
Macnish (2018, p. 425) suggests that, in a version of this case, in which the
stranger has not opened the diary, control but no privacy has been diminished,
such that losing control is not sufficient for losing privacy. He also contends that
this version is, with one important difference, relevantly similar to the real life
situation in which many of us are with respect to the NSA and GCHQ. The
important common point is that personal information is readily available to
the NSA, GCHQ, and the finder of the diary, but in most cases the information
has not been accessed. The difference is that the secret services ‘have actively
pursued the collection of data’ (Macnish 2018, p. 426), while in the case sketched
above, the other person finds the diary in a café.
Let us take a step back from the particular scenarios. Then we can see that
threatened loss cases have a common structure. Personal information about an
agent A is readily available to another agent B, B knows about this, can easily
intervene and, thereby, access and learn the information about A, yet B does not
do so. There seems to be consensus in the literature that the fact that B can
easily access and learn personal information about A and that B knows that this
is so diminishes A’s control over the information. Moreover, it is taken for
granted that the control account of privacy implies that this also diminishes
A’s privacy. For many, this is an implausible implication and they conclude that
the control account should be dismissed.
Proponents of control accounts can reply in two ways. First, they can argue
that it is, contrary to what has just been said, intuitively plausible that privacy is
diminished in the cases presented above. That is, they could try to turn the
tables and say that it is a virtue rather than a vice of control accounts that they
imply that privacy is diminished in the diary, X-ray and NSA cases. I will briefly
come back to this line of defense at the end of Section 5. However, I share the
intuition of those who find it more plausible that privacy is not diminished in
threatened loss cases. Therefore, I will opt for the second reply and argue that,
contrary to what has been said above, the control account does not necessarily
imply that privacy is diminished in threatened loss cases. This is what I will
show in the next section.
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3 From Frankfurt to threatened loss cases
In what follows I will argue for two claims. First, we are, in everyday life and
philosophical discourse, familiar with a kind of control which is not diminished in
threatened loss cases; second, proponents of the control account can use this
notion in order to spell out their view that privacy is essentially about having
control. I will proceed by developing an argument from analogy. I will show that
threatened loss cases have striking similarities with Frankfurt cases (see Frankfurt
1969) in the debate about responsibility and determinism and I will argue that
these similarities point to a new way to understand control accounts of privacy.
Let me begin with a bit of background about Frankfurt cases. The uncon-
tested starting point is the idea that an agent is only responsible for a certain
action if she has control over it. If you have no control over how your body
moves, then you are not responsible for this movement. But what is this kind of
control? Everyday thinking suggests that we should understand it as the ability
to do otherwise, which I will call leeway control (see, e. g. McKenna and
Pereboom 2016, ch. 2). If you step on my foot but you could not have done
otherwise, then it seems natural to think that you are not responsible for
stepping on my foot. Moreover, it is suggesting to think that determinism rules
out a person’s ability to do otherwise. Combining these ideas yields incompati-
bilism about determinism and responsibility. If leeway control is necessary for
responsibility and if determinism rules out leeway control, then nobody is
responsible in a deterministic world.
Frankfurt cases aim at showing that the first assumption is false: a person
can be responsible for what she does even if she cannot do otherwise. There are
two main ideas associated with Frankfurt cases (see Sartorio 2016 for an over-
view). First, we should distinguish between factors that explain why an agent
acts the way she does and factors that explain why she cannot act otherwise.
Second, the latter factors by themselves do not undermine the responsibility of
the agent. In most everyday cases both factors fall together. If I step on your foot
because someone pushes me, then the factor that explains why I stepped on
your foot is the very same factor that explains why I could not have done
otherwise: namely because someone pushed me. But there are cases in which
the two factors fall apart – Frankfurt cases. In these cases, there is a factor that
explains why an agent has no leeway control (cannot do otherwise), but this
factor does not explain why the agent acts the way she does. In these cases, it
seems that the agent is responsible for what she does. Thus, Frankfurt cases aim
at showing that one can have the control which is necessary for being respon-
sible for an action even if one does not have leeway control over it.
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Here is a typical Frankfurt case (from the good old days):
Because he dares to hope that the Democrats finally have a good chance of winning the
White House, the benevolent but elderly neurosurgeon, Black, has come out of retirement
to participate in yet another philosophical example. […] He has secretly inserted a chip in
Jones’s brain that enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities. Black can
exercise this control through a sophisticated computer that he has programmed so that,
among other things, it monitors Jones’s voting behavior. If Jones were to show any
inclination to vote for McCain (or, let us say, anyone other than Obama), then the
computer, through the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene to assure that he actually
decides to vote for Obama and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for
Obama (as Black, the old progressive would prefer), the computer does nothing but
continue to monitor – without affecting – the goings-on in Jones’s head.
Now suppose that Jones decides to vote for Obama on his own, just as he would have
if Black had not inserted the chip in his head. It seems, upon first thinking about this case,
that Jones can be held morally responsible for his choice and act of voting for Obama,
although he could not have chosen otherwise and he could not have done otherwise
(Fischer 2010, p. 316).
The factors that explain why Jones has no leeway control over his voting (such
that he cannot refrain from voting for Obama) are Black and his fantastic
devices. But the factors that explain Jones’ actual voting for Obama are not
Black and his devices, but some features of Jones himself, namely his beliefs,
desires, intentions, and so on. Even if Black were not present, he would have
voted for Obama and the process that led to his voting for Obama would have
been exactly the same. Therefore, his actual voting for Obama still seems to be
up to him in a certain sense and he still seems to be responsible for voting for
Obama. I will call the kind of control that Jones has over his voting for Obama
source control (see, again, McKenna and Pereboom 2016, chap. 2). The idea is,
roughly, that we do not need the ability to do otherwise in order to be respon-
sible for our actions. What we need is to be the right kind of source of our
actions, such that the actions are our actions in a specific sense. I will come back
to the question of how to spell out what it means to be the right kind of source
below.
As many will know, the debate about Frankfurt cases goes on and on. And
my aim is not to say anything illuminating about them here. My aim is rather to
show that control theorists of privacy can find inspiration for a new account of
threatened loss cases in the discussion about Frankfurt cases.
In what follows, I will focus on Macnish’s (2018, p. 420) diary case and add a
few lines in order to make the analogy clear.
Diary Case 2: Imagine that I leave my diary on a table in a coffee shop and return to that
shop 30minutes later to retrieve it. When I enter the shop I see a stranger with my diary on
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her table, a different table from the one at which I was sitting. I therefore know that she, or
someone, has moved my diary; but have they read it? Imagine that the stranger has not yet
read it but wants to know what my last entry says. She has firmly decided to read it before
3 pm and she would read it even in my presence (imagine that she is very strong and I
would not be able to prevent her from reading it). I come back at 2.55 pm and tell her: ‘It’s
terrible, I’m forgetting everything these days! I hope I’m not getting ill. Actually, I wrote
about it in my diary this morning. Please, look at the last pages.’ In response to this, the
stranger reads my last entry in the diary.
In order to see the structural similarities between Frankfurt and threatened loss
cases, it is helpful to, first, think of Jones in the Frankfurt case as analogous to
me in the new diary case – I will call them (Jones and me) agent A. Second, let
us think of Black and his devices in the Frankfurt case as analogous to the
stranger in the diary case 2 – agent B. Third, the event of Jones’ voting for
Obama corresponds to the event of the stranger’s learning about my last entry in
the diary – event E. Now, control theorists can argue in the following, to-be-
specified way. In Frankfurt and threatened loss cases, B makes it the case that A
does not have a certain kind of control over E. More specifically, A cannot
effectively choose whether or not E happens. However, A still has another
kind of control over E, namely A is the right kind of source of E’s actual taking
place. And it is, control theorists of privacy can continue, the latter kind of
control that is relevant for privacy. The conclusion is, then, that A still has
privacy in this threatened loss case, despite losing leeway control, because A
maintains source control. Let me elaborate.
In both cases, there are factors that explain why an agent A (Jones and I)
cannot effectively choose whether or not event E happens (Jones votes for
Obama, the stranger learns about my last entry). It is important to stress the
‘whether or not’. For A, there is only one option to realize. Jones cannot
effectively choose whether or not he will vote for Obama because if he shows
any inclination not to, Black will make him vote for Obama. And I cannot
effectively choose whether or not the stranger will learn about the last entry in
my diary because if I were to ask her to not read it, she would read it anyway.
That is, in both cases A does not have leeway control over whether or not event
E happens.
The factors that explain why E happens have nothing to do with the factors
that explain why A has no effective choice. The factors that explain why A has
no effective choice are about another agent B (Black and the stranger). In the
Frankfurt case, the factors that explain why Jones has no effective choice are
Black and his devices. In diary case 2, the factors that explain why I cannot
effectively choose whether or not the stranger learns about my last entry are that
the diary is close to her on her table and that she has firmly decided to read it
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before 3 pm (and that she is very strong). However, these factors about B do not
explain why event E takes place. The factors that explain why E happens are
about A, not about B. That is, Jones votes for Obama simply because he wants to
and decides to do it. He would have done the same if Black and his devices were
absent. I let the stranger read the entry because I want her to read it and decide
to ask her to read it. I would have let her read it even if she had not decided to
read it anyway (or if she wasn’t that strong).
In an intuitive sense, event E is up to A. Jones’ voting for Obama and the
stranger’s learning personal information about me are up to Jones and me; we
make these things happen; we have an important kind of control (source con-
trol) over them.
Proponents of the control account of privacy can use this analogy by arguing
that privacy should be understood as source control over (access to) information,
not as leeway control. In threatened loss cases, agents lose leeway control over
(access to) the relevant information. An agent A has this kind of control just in case
she can effectively choose between different options, namely between whether B
accesses or learns about the information or not. However, A still has source control
over (access to) the information in threatened loss cases. Intuitively, we can think of
source control as one’s being able to knock on one’s neighbor’s door and tell her
something new about oneself. And we can have this kind of control even if our
neighbor would learn the information anyway. More formally, A has source control
over (access to) information just in case A is the right kind of source of the
information flow, if the information flows to another person at all.
When is an agent the ‘right kind of source’ of an information flow? Giving a
full answer to this question would require, plausibly, a whole book. But there
are two places where the control theorist can look for models. The first is
compatibilism about responsibility and determinism (see, e. g. Frankfurt 1971;
Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Proponents of this view look for an account of being
the right kind of source of an action that supports the idea that an agent can be
responsible for it even if she cannot do otherwise. One famous account says,
very roughly, that Jones is the right kind of source if he does not only desire to
vote for Obama but also desires to desire that he vote for Obama (see Frankfurt
1971). Control theorists about privacy could adopt this idea. They could say that I
have privacy with regard to certain pieces of information just in case if these
pieces of information flow to another person at all, then this is the result of my
desiring it and my desiring that I desire it to flow in this way. In the diary case,
the stranger would diminish my privacy if she learns about the last entry even
though my first- or second-order desires were against this flow of information.
The second place to look for models for how to understand being the right
kind of source of information flow is the debate about informed consent. The
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idea is that an agent’s consenting to a medical treatment, sexual intercourse,
and so on, is only valid if the agent fulfills certain conditions. These conditions
are often spelled out without requiring the straightforward ability to do other-
wise. One prominent account says, for example, that the agent has to consent
intentionally, she has to understand what is at issue, and she has to consent
voluntarily (without being coerced, manipulated, and so on) (see, e. g.
Beauchamp 2010; Beauchamp and Childress 2013, ch. 4). Adapting this view to
a source control account of privacy would yield the following rough picture: I
have privacy with regard to certain information just in case if the information
flows to another person at all, then this is because I intend it to, I voluntarily let
it flow in this way and I understand what is at issue. In a version of the case in
which the stranger reads in the diary before I come back, these conditions are
not fulfilled. I do not intend to let the information flow in this way and, thereby,
my privacy is diminished.
I am well aware that these pictures of responsibility and of valid consent are
highly contested. And I am not claiming that these are the best ways to make
sense of what it is to be the right kind of source of an information flow. The
important ideas that I want to make clear at this point are, first, that there is room
for a kind of control over (access to) information which does not involve leeway
control and, second, what the resulting control account of privacy could look like.
To sum up, just as responsibility theorists distinguish between leeway and
source control over actions, privacy scholars should distinguish between leeway
and source control over (access to) information. Frankfurt cases are the rare
cases in which it becomes clear that agents do not have leeway but do have
source control over what they do. Similarly, privacy scholars can say that
threatened loss cases are such that it becomes clear that an agent can lose
leeway control over (access to) personal information but maintain source con-
trol. Privacy scholars can add that the kind of control that is relevant for privacy
is source control, not leeway control. According to the resulting source control
account of privacy, the nature of privacy is being the right kind of source of
information flows, if it flows at all. As this kind of control is not diminished in
threatened loss cases, proponents of this account would say that privacy is not
diminished in threatened loss cases.
4 Three views on privacy
One may ask now how exactly the source control account of privacy is supposed
to differ from the leeway control and the access-based view. More specifically,
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does it have implications that deviate in relevant ways from the other two
accounts? In order to answer this question, I will apply the views to different
cases.
Recall, first, the
Original Diary Case (see Macnish 2018, p. 420, p. 425): Imagine that I leave my diary on a
table in a coffee shop and return to that shop 30minutes later to retrieve it. When I enter
the shop I see a stranger with my diary on her table, a different table from the one at which
I was sitting. I therefore know that she, or someone, has moved my diary; but have they
read it? Imagine that the stranger has not read it and has firmly decided not to read it. The
stranger gives me the diary. I can tell the stranger about the content, but I don’t.
This is a standard threatened loss case. Leeway control accounts imply that my
privacy was diminished at the moment in which I lost the ability to effectively
choose whether or not the stranger or someone else would read my diary. Source
control and access-based views, by contrast, say that no privacy is diminished in
this case because the stranger has not accessed the information and the relevant
information has not flowed to another person.
Now consider
Diary Case 3: The only difference to the original case is that the stranger, unbeknownst to
me, reads my diary before I come back. That is, I can tell the stranger about the content of
my diary, though I don’t, but the stranger has already learned about it anyway.
Again, leeway control theorists say that privacy has been diminished before the
stranger reads my diary, namely when I lost effective choice with regard to the
relevant information. By contrast, access-based and source control views say
that I lose my privacy when the stranger actually reads my diary. However, the
two accounts differ with regard to the explanation of why my privacy is dimin-
ished in this moment. Access-based views say that privacy is lost because the
stranger actually accesses the relevant information. Source control views explain
the loss of privacy by referring to the fact that the stranger lets information
about me flow without my being the right kind of source of this flow.
Finally, take
Diary Case 4: This case is identical with case 2 from the previous section (the one
analogous to the Frankfurt case) with the only difference being that the stranger does
not intend to read my diary. That is, when I come back to the coffee shop, I freely and
knowingly ask the stranger, who has not read my diary and does not plan to read it, to
read the last entry of my diary. In response, the stranger reads it.
Again, leeway views say that I lost privacy when I lost effective choice. Access-
based views say that I lose my privacy when the stranger reads the diary and,
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thereby, accesses personal information. On the source control view, by contrast,
no privacy is diminished. The view says that privacy is only diminished when
information flows without one’s being the right kind of source. Plausibly, how-
ever, I am the right kind of source of the information flow in diary case 4
because the stranger reads the diary in response to my giving valid consent.
To sum up, the three views discussed so far have different results when
applied to specific cases. They differ with regard to how they answer the
questions of whether privacy is diminished at all, of when, and of why privacy
is diminished. Thus, the source control account is a substantial alternative to the
leeway control and the access-based view.
5 Why opt for source control?
Recall that the main aim of this paper is to defend the control account against
the objection that it has the wrong implication when applied to threatened loss
cases. In order to achieve this aim, I have developed a new version of the control
account and shown how it differs from standard alternatives. But are there
reasons for accepting this view rather than one of the others? In what follows,
I will mainly compare the source control with the leeway control account, but I
will begin by giving a brief sketch of what I take to be an advantage of the
source control over the access-based view (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for
pressing me on this).
Recall that in diary case 4, the access-based view says that my privacy is
diminished when the stranger reads my diary as a response to my giving valid
consent to her reading the last entry. Similarly, the view implies that we lose
privacy when we freely and knowingly tell our friends about our problems,
desires, and secrets. According to this view, whenever someone else accesses
certain information about us, our privacy is diminished.
I take this to be implausible (see also Inness 1992, p. 46). Intuitively, sharing
private information with someone close to us does not necessarily involve losing
or diminishing privacy. We do not have less privacy when we have shared
privacy. But this is what the access-based view implies. The source control
account, by contrast, says that when we are the right kind of source of the
information flow, say, when we freely and knowingly tell our friends about
something personal, then we do not lose privacy and no privacy is diminished.
This seems to be the correct result.
Admittedly however, intuitions seem to clash here. Macnish, for example,
explicitly says (2018, p. 422) that telling friends about personal matters diminishes
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one’s privacy. While he finds this intuitive, I find it very counter-intuitive. This
suggests that more needs to be done to settle the dispute between access-based
and source control views. In the meantime, I propose to draw the moderate
conclusion that those who have the intuition that sharing private information
does not necessarily diminish privacy should opt for the source control rather
than the access-based view.
Let me now turn to a comparison of the leeway and the source control
account. The first advantage of the source control account is obvious. Opting for
this view avoids what many take to be an implausible implication of leeway
accounts, namely that people lose privacy in threatened loss cases. As I have
shown above, many authors reject control accounts at least partly because of
this implication (e. g. Parent 1983b; Rickless 2007; Davis 2009; Macnish 2018).
As the source control account does not have this implication, this is a good
reason to adopt the source control account, rather than the leeway account.
The second advantage of the source control account is that leeway control
accounts seem to have counter-intuitive implications if our world turns out to be
deterministic. Leeway control accounts say that privacy involves the ability to
effectively choose between different options with regard to who knows or
accesses personal information. If determinism is true, then it seems as if nobody
can ever make such an effective choice (see McKenna and Pereboom 2016, chap.
1 for an overview). Thus, it seems that, on this picture, no human has privacy in
a deterministic world. This is a surprising implication. If your diary is in your
safe and nobody but you has access to it and nobody knows about it as long as
you don’t consent to her learning about it, then the contents of your diary clearly
are private. And this seems to be so, regardless of the truth or falsehood of
determinism. The truth or falsehood of determinism seems to be irrelevant when
we want to know whether or not a person has privacy with regard to certain
information. However, according to leeway control accounts of privacy, the truth
or falsehood of determinism seems to be relevant. And this speaks against the
leeway control account.
The source control account has a better chance of avoiding the implication
that nobody has privacy in a deterministic world. Both sketches of being the
right kind of source of information flow that I have presented in the preceding
section are compatible with the truth and with the falsehood of determinism.
Even if determinism is true, you can desire and desire to desire to let another
person know about your health condition and you can tell her about it volun-
tarily, intentionally and with a sufficient understanding of the situation. Thus,
source control over (access to) information is, plausibly, compatible with deter-
minism such that this view avoids the implication that no human has privacy in
a deterministic world.
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As an intermediate conclusion, the source control account avoids some
counter-intuitive implications of the leeway control account of privacy.
Proponents of the leeway control account may reply that this is only a half-
hearted argument for the source control account. Leeway control over (access to)
information is, they may say, what we actually care about, what is important to
us, and what we really need. Thus, they could conclude that the leeway control
account is the only view that makes sense of the intuitive value and importance
of privacy.
As a reply, let me present some considerations that are typically taken to
show that privacy as control in general is important and let me show that they
also support the idea that privacy as source control is valuable. To avoid
misunderstandings, the thesis I am going to argue for in the remainder of this
section is not that the source control account is to be preferred over the leeway
control account. More moderately, the goal right now is to show that the leeway
control and the source control account can make sense of the intuitive value of
privacy in very similar ways. However, this result may be combined with the
claim defended above, which held that the source control account deals better
with both threatened loss cases and the possible truth of determinism; and this
yields a powerful argument to the conclusion that the source control account is
to be preferred over the leeway control account.
First, being able to control who knows what about us is very helpful in a
competitive and less-than-fully-tolerant society. It is important to control
whether our employer knows what diseases we may have and in many situations
it is important to control who knows our religion, sexual orientation, the family
planning choices we may have made, and so on. In a world such as ours,
controlling information about us protects us from an intolerant society and it
protects our bargaining power.
Can the source control account make sense of this idea? Surely it can. What
is valuable, according to this view, is being the right kind of source of informa-
tion flow. For example, the source control account says that I have privacy with
regard to what my boss knows about my health condition, as long as, if the
relevant information flows to her at all, I am the right kind of source of this flow.
And as long as this is so, my bargaining power is protected. But if someone tells
her about my health condition without my being the source of this information
flow, then I lose source control, and, thereby, my bargaining power is dimin-
ished. Thus, source control protects us and our bargaining power from an
intolerant society.
Second, control over (access to) certain information about us protects our
individual liberty and autonomy, and, thereby, our democratic system. There are
many things that we would not do if we had no control over who will or can
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learn about our doing it. These include trivial acts such as singing in the shower,
but also discussing controversial political or religious questions. And being able
to do these things is important for shaping our lives according to our own values
(see, e. g. Fried 1968; Rössler 2004, chap. 3, 2017). This may be taken to suggest
that privacy protects autonomy by detaching the individual from society. But, as
many recent scholars have argued, the role of privacy need not be understood in
this way (see, e. g. the essays in Rössler and Mokrosinska 2015). One can think of
autonomy as being socially embedded such that it only develops and is exer-
cised in relationships and in society more generally. And control over (access to)
personal information is, as I will show in a moment, very helpful or even
required for shaping relationships, and, thereby, for developing and shaping
autonomy. Additionally, a well-functioning democratic system needs citizens
who act autonomously in the public sphere. But it is very plausible that humans
are such that they sometimes need a break from this sphere. We could not play
our public roles if we had to play them all the time. Thus, we sometimes need
control over who can observe us when we are not playing our public roles in
order to, at other times, participate in public democratic processes (see, e. g.
Rössler 2017; for similar ideas see Lever 2013; Roberts 2015; Mokrosinska 2018).
Thus, control over (access to) information protects our individual liberty, our
ability to live an autonomous life, and, thereby, our democratic system.
Again, source control over information can fulfill these important functions.
The source control view says that we have privacy with regard to our contro-
versial political views or with regard to what we do when we leave the public
sphere as long as, if this information flows at all to other people, then we are the
right kind of source of this information flow. If we fear that the information
flows even though we do not play the right kind of role in this process, then we
will not feel free to openly discuss our ideas, to experiment with ways of living,
relationships, and so on. This will destroy the social context that we need to
develop and exercise autonomy, it will restrict our individual liberty and it will
not give us the break we need in order to participate in public life. Having source
control would protect us from all this. Thus, source control over (access to)
information protects autonomy, the social context in which it is exercised,
individual liberty, and the democratic system.
Third, different relationships are partly constituted by what one reveals to
the other party. Most friendships, for example, involve letting the friend know
about certain aspects of oneself that one does not reveal to most others. If we
have no control over information about us, it would be much harder for us to
form relationships of different degrees of intimacy and closeness. And being
able to distinguish between a close friend and a mere acquaintance is an
important aspect of the well-being of most people. Thus control over (access
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to) information about us protects an important aspect of the well-being of most
people (see, e. g. Fried 1968; Rachels 1975; Gerstein 1978; Moore 2010, ch. 2;
Marmor 2015).
Source control can serve this function, too. Our telling a friend about our
health problem can be an expression of trust and intimacy, and, thereby, shape
our friendship. If we are not the source of this information flow because some-
one else tells our friend about our health then this will not be an expression of
our trust and intimacy and will not shape our relationship in the corresponding
way. What we need in order to form relationships is source control over infor-
mation flow. Thus, source control protects our ability to shape relationships.
To sum up, many control theorists have argued that control over (access to)
personal information plays very valuable roles and that, therefore, the control
account can make sense of the idea that privacy is important. I have argued that
the source control account of privacy can adopt the same lines of thinking
because source control over (access to) personal information plays the roles
that control theorists want control to play.
Some control theorists will not accept this conclusion. So far, I have only
considered cases in which source and leeway control views converge to the
implication that privacy is diminished and that something valuable has been
lost. However, source and leeway control accounts come apart, namely in
threatened loss cases. As I said at the end of Section 2, some control theorists
will say that it is plausible that privacy is diminished in these cases. Moreover,
they may add that something valuable has been diminished. They could argue,
for example, that privacy is important because it prevents others from obtaining
power over us. In some threatened loss cases personal information about us is
easily available to people who should not have power over us such that this
protection has been lost (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point).
Others may argue that we need leeway control over concealment and exposure
in complex societies like ours. This valuable kind of control gets lost in threat-
ened loss cases, too (thanks to another anonymous reviewer for this point).
Based on these ideas, some may object that the source control account is
essentially incomplete: because the source control view cannot explain that
privacy and some values protected by privacy can get lost in threatened loss
cases, we should dismiss it.
As a first reply, and as I will show in more detail in the next section,
proponents of the source control view can make sense of the idea that important
values, like protection from power and leeway control over concealment and
exposure, get lost in threatened loss cases. They only insist that privacy does not
get lost. Secondly, it seems that we have reached a clash of intuitions again.
Whereas some proponents of leeway control views may find it intuitive that
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privacy is diminished in threatened loss cases, many others (e. g. Parent 1983b;
Rickless 2007; Davis 2009; Macnish 2018), me including, find this counter-
intuitive.
In light of this apparent clash of intuitions, the main theses of this paper can
be understood as being the following: first, it is possible to combine the intui-
tively plausible (but not universally accepted) assumption that privacy is not
diminished in threatened loss cases with the idea that privacy is essentially a
kind of control. Second, the resulting source control view has some interesting
and plausible features.
6 Back to state surveillance
Recall that discussing the concept or definition of privacy has become important
in recent years because of two opposed evaluations of state mass surveillance.
While one group, including then-NSA director Keith Alexander, said that no
privacy was diminished by what the NSA and GCHQ did, many others contended
that privacy was in fact diminished. Let me apply the account I have developed
to this debate.
Macnish interprets the NSA and GCHQ case analogously to the original diary
case which is, then, analogous to Parent’s classical X-ray case. And most
authors in this debate agree that control accounts imply that privacy is dimin-
ished in these cases. Thus, they take the control account to be committed to the
claim that the NSA’s and GCHQ’s making personal data readily available is a
form of privacy invasion and diminishes citizens’ privacy even if nobody
actually accesses and learns the relevant information.
I have argued that this reading of control accounts presupposes a leeway
control account of privacy, according to which privacy involves the ability to
effectively choose whether or not others learn or have access to certain informa-
tion. Once the relevant data are available to the NSA and GCHQ, you cannot do
anything in order to stop them from accessing or learning the information. Thus,
your leeway control is diminished.
I have also argued that there is an alternative to the leeway control account,
namely the source control account of privacy. According to the source control
account, privacy essentially consists in being the right kind of source of infor-
mation flow to another agent if the information flows at all. In threatened loss
cases, including the NSA and GCHQ case, the information does not flow to
another agent as long as nobody actually accesses the data and learns some-
thing about the relevant citizens. To illustrate, imagine that the data collected by
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the NSA would tell them that Anna wrote her psychotherapist an email on Friday
at noon. As long as nobody has actually accessed this piece of information,
Anna can still go to the NSA and tell everybody that she wrote her psychothera-
pist an email on Friday at noon. Thus, she can still be the right kind of source of
this information flow. This kind of control is diminished, however, as soon as an
NSA employee accesses the data before Anna tells her about it. Thus, the source
control account of privacy says that Keith Alexander was right: no privacy is
diminished as long as the information is not accessed.
In Section 1, I distinguished between the conceptual question of whether
privacy is such that the activities of the NSA and GCHQ diminished citizens’
privacy and the normative question of whether these activities are legitimate. So
far, I have presented an answer to the conceptual question. One may now ask if
this answer has implications for the normative project. One may wonder, for
example, whether the claim that Keith Alexander was right in saying that the
NSA did not diminish privacy as long as no information was accessed implies
that there is nothing problematic about what the NSA did. Importantly, this does
not follow. Let me elaborate.
Macnish (2018, Secs. 3 & 4) argues convincingly for the claim that what the
NSA and GCHQ did may have been illegitimate even if no privacy was dimin-
ished. The first reason is that making someone believe that her privacy has been
invaded can be bad for her even if her privacy was not in fact diminished. This
has been well known ever since Bentham’s theory of the panopticon in which
the prisoners never know whether they are being observed and, therefore,
always (or mostly) act as if they were being observed. This is a way of control-
ling citizens that diminishes their liberty to a problematic degree. Thus, letting
citizens believe that their privacy can be diminished at any time is problematic
in this respect.
The second line of thinking that shows that the activities of the NSA and
GCHQ may be illegitimate is that what they did increases the risk that privacy
will in fact be diminished. They have made the data and information readily
available and, therefore, the risk that they will actually invade our privacy has
become much greater. Making people subject to such a risk is problematic.
Third, an idea not discussed by Macnish and hinted at above is that it is
important for citizens to be protected from the power of other agents, be it
institutions or individuals. Making data about citizens available to these agents
diminishes this protection. These agents can obtain power by accessing the data
directly or by letting machines analyze them, for example in order to use the
results for targeted political campaigning. Thus, the activities of the NSA and
GCHQ may have been illegitimate because they diminished an important pro-
tection from power.
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Macnish draws a general conclusion:
[F]ocusing on privacy distracts all involved from the real issues of harm to the general
populace. Indeed, by focusing the argument on privacy it may be harder to persuade
supporters of actions taken by NSA and GCHQ that what they are doing is harmful. They
have a response to that argument, namely that they are not violating people’s privacy
except in specific, justifiable, targeted cases (Macnish 2018, p. 429).
I agree with this conclusion. What is normatively and politically problematic in
the NSA and GCHQ case is not that people’s privacy is diminished but other
harms and wrongdoings. The important difference between Macnish’s and my
account is, however, that I take this conclusion to be compatible with and even
supported by a control account of privacy, namely the source control account.
To sum up, I have argued for a new version of the control account of
privacy, according to which having privacy with regard to information is being
the right kind of source of information flow, if information flows at all. This view
has many of the positive aspects of classical control accounts, offers a new
interpretation of threatened loss cases and, thereby, avoids an implication of
typical control accounts that many find problematic. Moreover, this view may
help us to focus better on the severe harms and wrongdoings associated with
state mass surveillance.
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